Demand dispatch is the science of extracting virtual energy storage through the automatic control of deferrable loads to provide balancing or regulation services to the grid, while maintaining consumer-end quality of service.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goals of this paper are twofold: 1) to analyze the structure of the optimal solution to the resource allocation problem investigated in [1] , and 2) to develop an understanding of the potential implications to market design.
A. Control techniques for demand dispatch
The term demand dispatch refers to the creation of virtual energy storage from deferrable loads. The key to success is automation: an appropriate distributed control architecture ensures that bounds on quality of service (QoS) are met and simultaneously ensures that the loads provide aggregate grid services comparable to a large battery system.
The 2018 IMA volume on the control of energy markets and grids contains several papers surveying distributed control techniques for demand dispatch [2] , [3] , [4] . The present work and [1] are based on the results surveyed in [2] : through distributed control, a heterogeneous population of loads such as residential water heaters can be controlled in such a way that quality of service (QoS)-in terms of temperature and cycling-of each load obeys strict constraints, while the Funding from the National Science Foundation under awards EPCN 1609131 & CPS 1646229 is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to funding from the State of Florida, through a REET (Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Technologies) grant. Many thanks to Prof. Frank Kelly who suggested we survey the history in telecommunications economics to investigate parallels with the power industry. 1 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611 2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611 and Rainbow Energy Marketing Corp. 3 Automatic Control Laboratory, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, Physikstrasse 3, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland power deviation can be adjusted up and down to provide grid services much like a battery system.
For loads such as water heating, air-conditioning, and refrigeration (examples of thermostatically controlled loads, or TCLs), there is a natural analog with batteries, with thermal energy storage replacing electrical energy storage. This storage is what allows large deviations in electric power consumption of the fleet, with imperceptible impact on service to consumers. Ample evidence of this potential is presented in [1] , [2] and their references.
The next question concerns the management of a large heterogeneous population of loads. When heterogeneity is not large (e.g., each load in the collection is a residential water heater, but the size varies across the population), then additional local control at each load can be designed to make the population appear homogeneous [5] , [6] . The problem addressed in this paper and in [1] is control of a highly diverse population of loads. Along with residential and commercial TCLs, these might include the residential pool pumps in a region, along with water pumping for irrigation or waste management. Control of the fleet is a dynamic resource allocation problem, which is formulated as a linear program in [7] and as a convex program in [1] .
The convex program is revisited here. The goal is to gain insight on the structure of the optimal solution for a model with one source of traditional generation and grid services obtained through demand dispatch of a large population of loads. It is assumed that there are M classes of loads; in each class, the population is homogeneous.
The QoS for the ith load class at time t is a functional of the state of charge (SoC) x i (t) used in battery models for thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) [8] and residential pools [9] , [10] . The SoC is assumed to evolve according to the linear system,
in which −z i (t) is power deviation at time t. Denoting the derivative by
the eqs. (1) and (2) constitute a linear dynamical system with state (x, z) and control input u. For a given input u, the resulting QoS for load class i is quantified by the integral of cost:
where each c i : R → R + is a strongly convex function. If this is small, then the aggregate SoC is small in an average sense. This is a necessary condition for each of the loads in the ith class to remain within individual QoS bounds. Simulation studies and analysis indicate that bounds on this aggregate QoS are also sufficient to ensure that a high percentage of the population will remain within individual target QoS levels, subject to the homogeneity of the load collection, the control architecture, the bounds on QoS, and other factors [2] , [8] .
As in [1] , a finite-horizon optimal control problem over [0, T ] is considered, with state cost given by
The term state space collapse comes from the literature on stochastic networks [11] , [12] , which may be regarded as a special case of the model reduction obtained using singular perturbation methods [13] .
The collapse demonstrated in this paper is obtained through the special structure of the dynamics of load and generation. The descriptor dynamics associated with the Mdimensional SoC process are obtained from (1):
in which
The evolution of the aggregate power deviation is similar but simpler:
What is crucial here is that the individual inputs {u i (t)} are not subject to individual cost constraints: it is only the sum that is subject to a cost indirectly, through the cost on generation ramping. Consequently, the optimal control formulations considered in this paper fall in the category of "cheap optimal control" [13] , [14] , [15] .
For a cost that is quadratic in (x, z σ , u σ ), it follows from the main result of [14] that the solution to the infinite-horizon optimal control problem has a simple form: There is a onedimensional subspace X such that x (t) ∈ X for all t > 0. These results are extended to include the finite-time horizon optimal control problem in [15] ; the optimal control evolves smoothly following a jump at time t = 0 [15, Theorem 5.8] .
The findings in the non-quadratic, finite time-horizon setting of this paper are equally remarkable: the marginal costs evolve in a two-dimensional subspace generated by a co-state process λ and its derivative; for t > 0:
Consequently, optimal SoC for each of the M load classes evolves in a two-dimensional manifold. These results are surveyed in Section III.
B. Implications for markets
Section IV reviews dynamic competitive equilibrium theory, and explains that the negative of the co-state function may be interpreted as a price in a competitive equilibrium. Extensions of results from [17] , [18] are obtained, relating average marginal cost of generation and average marginal value of load classes to average prices. An example of the Fig. 1 . The competitive equilibrium price ρ = −λ when the nominal net-load is piecewise constant. The quantity and distribution of loads were chosen based on California's usage [1] , [26] . The residential air conditioners and commercial water heaters exceeded capacity bounds (by a few degrees for a few hours). The optimal generation g is nearly constant, despite the 40GW load surge.
competitive equilibrium price for a model in which the QoS cost functions are all quadratic is shown in Fig. 1 . In this example, the net-load is piecewise constant, and the resulting optimal generation is relatively smooth. The price is also smooth, and anticipates the surge in load well before its occurrence. The details of the simulation are contained in Section V.
The results in Section IV close a logical gap in the prior work [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] (and many others), in which the utility function for the consumer is assumed to be a concave function of power, rather than a natural metric such as the QoS (3).
Consumer QoS is included in the formulation of the competitive equilibrium analysis in [21] , but in this prior work, it is assumed that power consumption from each residential load can be varied continuously; however, the residential loads considered for demand-side management are typically ON/OFF devices. In the present paper, resource allocation is performed over load aggregations modeled as virtual batteries. Consequently, the SoC and power trajectories can be assumed to be smooth-see [5] , [10] , [22] , which discuss the mean-field characteristics of load aggregations under demand dispatch.
These economic findings should be viewed with caution. It would be naive to think that real-time control can be achieved using the price signals discovered in Section IV. It is typically assumed that price discovery occurs through an auction. Do we believe these non-causal prices will emerge from an auction? In the experiments surveyed in Section V, the cost functions are modified so that the consumers experience no loss of QoS, and the resulting average price is nearly zero. How then can these prices provide any incentive for participation?
The resource allocation problem introduced in [1] and investigated in this paper is intended to be part of a model predictive control (MPC) architecture, while control through price signals is inherently open loop. Imagine attempting to apply MPC using price signals? The aggregators managing the loads would not be able to predict re-calculated prices and might make decisions that would create personal losses or windfalls purely based on the control architecture. This would create uncertainty in the control solution and the longterm sustainability of the grid-aggregator relationship.
For these reasons, it is assumed here that a balancing authority solves the optimal resource allocation problem, and control of individual loads is achieved through automation.
There is history that supports the belief that automation rather than price signals is the most efficient and reliable way to control the grid. Following deregulation of the industry in the 1980s, telephone companies investigated real-time pricing (alternately called "measured rates") for local service, based on the assumption that measured-rate pricing could substantially increase economic efficiency. However, looking specifically at the net welfare effects on customers, studies found that measured rates often result in efficiency losses. In addition, the telephone subscribers had difficulty understanding and coping with complicated tariff structures, and the systems required to implement them were too complex [23] . With the integration of distributed energy resources, which are characterized by high fixed costs and essentially zero variable costs, the grid increasingly has characteristics similar to the telecommunications industry. Further discussion on these issues is contained in [24] .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The dynamic control problem is introduced in Section II-A, which is based on the model introduced in [1] . The major departure from [1] is the relaxation of hard constraints on any resource. This is reasonable for control outside of a major crisis. The preliminaries required for analysis of the optimal solution are introduced in Section II. The main results surveyed in Section III demonstrate state space collapse, and economic implications are contained in Section IV. Numerical simulations are provided in Section V. Conclusions and directions for future research are discussed in Section VI. 
II. PRELIMINARIES
For a function K : R 3 → R we adopt the standard calculus notation:
A. Resource allocation control architecture The optimal control architecture is defined by a convex program over the time-horizon [0, T ]:
with x(0), z(0) ∈ R M given. These equations are adapted from eq. (14) of [1] , but the motivations and assumptions here are different. The analysis here allows general strongly convex and twice continuously differentiable cost on SoC and generation, but maintains the quadratic cost on ramping imposed in [1] : (A1) The net load is C 1 . The cost functions {c i } and c g are non-negative, class C 2 , and strongly convex: c i (x) ≥ µ for some µ > 0 and all i, x. The ramping cost is quadratic: for fixed κ > 0,
The objective is to minimize the cost of traditional generation, the cost on ramping of traditional generation, and the cost on SoC of load classes subject to: (i) the constraint of balancing the net load with traditional generation g and power deviation from flexible loads z, (7b); (ii) the dynamics of generator ramping, (7c); and (iii) the dynamical constraints on load classes, (7d) and (7e).
The optimization problem (7a) may be regarded as a fully observed, finite-horizon control problem. In order to put this in state space form, it is necessary to eliminate the algebraic constraint (7b). The resulting state process is [x(t), z(t)] ∈ R 2M , the input is u(t) ∈ R M , and the cost function is obtained by eliminating g(t) and γ(t) from (7a) using eqs. (7b), (7c) and (8) to obtain
where
The total cost in (7a) is the integral of (9). This is a singular control problem because the control cost is degenerate: the terms involving the control cost in (9) are expressed purely in terms of the sum u σ (t). It is found that this singularity is a great benefit for obtaining structure for the optimal control solution.
B. Value functions
For t 0 ∈ [0, T ), the cost-to-go is denoted,
where the infimum is over continuous u, subject to (7b)-(7e), and with x(t 0 ) = x, z(t 0 ) = z given. Prop. 2.1 asserts that the cost-to-go can be expressed purely as a function of (x σ , z σ ). This is the first evidence of state space collapse. Denote
where the infimum is over
The following hold under Assumption (A1): for each t 0 ∈ [0, T ), (i) J is convex in (x, z) and finite-valued.
The proof of Prop. 2.1 and most of the results that follow are contained in the appendix.
For a given initial condition x, z, with the optimal state trajectory {x (t), z (t) : 0 < t ≤ T }, denote
In addition to (A1), the following assumptions are imposed throughout the remainder of the paper: (A2)
For each t 0 ∈ [0, T ) and each initial condition (x, z), the optimal control problem admits a unique solution
(b) There are right hand limits at t 0 , denoted
III. STATE SPACE COLLAPSE
Thm. 3.1 unveils the structure of the optimal solution: in particular, the M -dimensional optimal state process x evolves on a two-dimensional manifold.
Theorem 3.1: For t ∈ (0, T ], the optimal solution (x (t), z (t), u (t), λ (t), β (t)) ∈ R 3M +2 is the solution to the following system of 3M + 2 equations:
where i ∈ {1, ..., M }, with the boundary conditions x(0+), z(0+), λ (T ) = 0, and β (T ) = 0. It follows from (13) and Assumption (A2b) that λ (0+) = K 1,0,0 (x σ (0), z σ (0), 0). Then, following (15c) and (15a), the optimal mapping (x(0+), z(0+)) = (x , z ) is obtained by
Equation (15c) has a remarkable interpretation: the marginal costs for the M different load classes evolve in a two-dimensional subspace generated by the functions {λ (t), d dt λ (t) : t ∈ (0, T ]}. Moreover, the optimal SoC evolves on a two-dimensional manifold:
The remainder of this section concerns two very different interpretations of λ . The first is easily predicted.
A. λ as co-state
The Hamiltonian with co-state variables λ, β ∈ R M corresponding to system equations (7d) and (7e), respectively, is denoted:
This notation for the co-state variables would appear to conflict with the notation in Thm. 3.1. The choice of notation is made clear in the following: Proposition 3.2: Associated with the optimal input-state (u , x , z ) are a pair of co-state variables λ , β evolving in R M and satisfying for 0 < t ≤ T ,
B. λ and a Lagrangian decomposition
Rather than eliminate the variable g using (7b), new insight is obtained on maintaining g, γ, x as variables in the optimization problem. First, construct a Lagrangian relaxation with Lagrange multiplier , as follows:
where as usual, the infimum is subject to (7c)-(7e), with given initial conditions. This amounts to a Lagrangian decomposition, consisting of the following M +1 independent optimization problems: (i) Minimization problem over {g(t),ġ(t)}:
where, based on the definition (7c),
where, after accounting for the constraints (7d), (7e),
The Euler-Lagrange equations lead to equations for the optimizers: Proposition 3.3: For any function that is continuously differentiable on (0, T ], if g and x i are C 1 optimizers for the minimization problems in eqs. (21) and (22), then they solve the following differential equations:
with boundary conditions c d (ġ (T )) = (T ) = 0.
The dual functional φ satisfies weak duality: φ ( ) ≤ J (x, z, 0) for any , and the dual convex program is defined as sup ρ φ ( ). The solution to the dual is obtained by combining Prop. 3.3 and Thm. 3.1, and from this we obtain strong duality:
Proposition 3.4: The dual admits an optimizer given by
IV. REAL TIME PRICES
A dynamic competitive equilibrium model is introduced in this section. Prop. 3.4 is applied to establish the existence of a competitive equilibrium, and other results from the previous section provide approximations of the average price in terms of both the average marginal value and the average marginal cost.
We begin by recalling basic concepts. A "snapshot" commodity market for a divisible good G ∈ R is defined based on two "utility functions": for consumption, U D : R → R, and for supply, U S : R → R. The social planner's problem (SPP) of macro-economics is defined as the optimization problem,
A solution is called an efficient allocation.
If the utility functions are strictly concave, and there exists an optimizer G , then there is a unique price that achieves the so-called competitive equilibrium (CE):
The price is the Lagrange multiplier associated with G D = G S in the equivalent formulation of the SPP [25] :
Formulations of dynamic CE theory address problems in which G is a function of time and subject to various constraints [25] ; see [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] for theory in the context of power systems.
The dynamic CE model considered in this section involves M +1 players: there is a single supplier (or class of suppliers) that provide traditional generation g and M consumers with power deviation −z i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ M . The utility function for each player is the negative of the cost on the SoC: U Di (z i ) = −c i x i ) and U S (g,ġ) = −c g (g) − c d (−ġ). The SPP is defined as follows:
subject to the balancing and dynamic constraints (7b)-(7e). This is equivalent to the optimization problem (7a) analyzed in the previous sections. The Lagrangian decomposition behind Prop. 3.4 is analogous to the Lagrangian relaxation of (7b) in (26) , and hence, (t) = −λ (t) is the competitive equilibrium price at time t, for 0 < t ≤ T . That is, the optimizers of eqs. (21) and (22) correspond to:
Two quantities of special interest in CE theory are the marginal cost and the marginal value at equilibrium. The marginal cost at time t is c g (g (t)), and the marginal value is defined as the negative of marginal cost for each load: −c i (x i (t)). The averages of these quantities and the equilibrium price are denoted, respectively,
In the snapshot CE model, it is known that the price coincides with both marginal value and marginal costthis is immediate from the Lagrangian decomposition of (25) . This conclusion fails in general in a dynamic setting. For the dynamic CE models considered in [17] , [18] , it is shown that the price coincides with the marginal value (in which the marginal value is defined with respect to power consumption), and the average price is approximated by average marginal cost. These conclusions admit the following extension to the CE model introduced in this paper:
Proposition 4.1: The average of the competitive equilibrium price admits the following approximations: (i) Weighted average marginal value, plus O(1/T ):
(ii) Average marginal cost, plus O(1/T ):
where the error terms are the differences, ġ (T ) ). Fig. 2 . Optimal SoC trajectories remain within capacity bounds throughout this run. The peak generation for the optimal solution is about 8GW less than what would be required without load control, and the generation ramping is reduced significantly.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Simulations were conducted to validate the main results of this paper. A discrete time approximation of the resource allocation problem (7a) was solved with 5 classes of loads: ACs, residential WHs with faster time cycles (fwh), commercial WHs with slower time cycles (swh), fridges, and pool pumps (pp), based on the SoC model used in [1] . The netload is based on "duck curve" predictions for California in March, 2020; this data is obtained from CAISO.
The results in Fig. 1 were obtained using quadratic cost on the SoC. Alternatives were tested to avoid the SoC violations (i.e., SoC/Capacity > 1) observed in that experiment. In the results surveyed here, the cost functions are strongly convex polynomials, c i (x) = κ 1 (x/C i ) 8 + κ 2 (x/C i ) 2 , where C i is the energy capacity of the load class i in GWh. For each class of TCLs, κ 1 = 1 and κ 2 = 0.1. Because QoS requirements for pools are less critical, the quadratic cost is maintained for pool pumps: κ 1 = 0 and κ 2 = 1. Following [1] , the cost on generation is of the form c g (x) = κ g [x − ] 2 , where κ g is a constant gain. Table I provides values of the SoC leakage parameters α i for the different load classes along with the energy capacities C i . The numbers are based on [1] and [26] . The top half of Fig. 2 shows the net-load (duck curve), the optimal traditional generation g , and the equilibrium price (normalized to ±1 $/unit energy), while the latter half shows the optimal SoC trajectories normalized by the respective energy capacities,
There is remarkable correspondence between the netload and the equilibrium price signal. As expected from combining Prop. 3.2 with Prop. 3.4, it is observed that the optimal SoC evolves in tandem with the price signal. For example, the negative prices in the afternoon lead to hotter than average WHs and cooler than average houses, whereas the higher prices in the late evening result in colder WHs and hotter houses. The polynomial costs on SoC indirectly impose QoS: notice that x i /C i is between ±1, which implies that the SoC for each load class is within the energy capacity limit.
The optimal SoC trajectories evolve in a two-dimensional subspace. Consequently, the optimal SoC trajectory of any Su bs pace prediction load class can be recovered based on observations of the SoC for two other load classes. In particular, given the optimal SoC of residential water heaters and ACs, we can recover the functions {λ (t), d dt λ (t) : 0 < t ≤ T } as follows:
We can hence recover any load trajectories using (17) . Fig. 3 shows that the SoC trajectory of pool pumps recovered using the optimal SoC trajectories of ACs and residential water heaters matches the optimal SoC trajectory of pool pumps.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is a remarkable fact that a 2M -dimensional optimal control problem can be reduced to just two dimensions, regardless of the number of load classes M . Beyond its computational value, the result provides new insight and has potential economic implications.
The most valuable implication of Thm. 3.1 is for numerical computation. We are investigating how to best apply state space collapse.
Analysis of the resource allocation problem for demand dispatch in a stochastic control setting, considering the impact of model uncertainty, is also a topic for future work.
We leave the reader to think over the following: can insight from the economic analysis be used to formulate contracts for grid services with large aggregators and industrial customers? The prices would not be used for real-time control, but they could be utilized to construct metrics in order to evaluate the performance of the participating consumers.
VII. APPENDIX
We begin with further clarity on cheap control: Lemma 7.1: For given t 0 ≥ 0, suppose that (x(t 0 ), z(t 0 )) and (x + , z + ) are two state values satisfying x σ (t 0 ) = x + σ , z σ (t 0 ) = z + σ . Then, for each δ > 0, there is a C ∞ input u satisfying u σ (t) = 0 for all t ≥ t 0 , and the resulting state trajectory from (x(t 0 ), z(t 0 )) satisfies
Proof: Without loss of generality we take t 0 = 0. Let f : R → R + be a C ∞ probability density, with support on the interval (0, δ), and choose
where f denotes the derivative of f . This is a "cheap control", since u σ (t) = 0 for all t. We then have by definition
This gives z i (δ) = z + i , and
The SoC trajectory is bounded, and x i (δ) = x + i + O(δ). Proof of Prop. 2.1: It is obvious that J is finite valued. To see that it is convex, let {(x i , z i ) : i = 0, 1} denote two initial conditions (starting at time t 0 ), fix θ ∈ (0, 1), and denote
for each t 0 . Consider any continuous input-state trajectories:
Because the system is linear, it follows that the convex combination is feasible from (x θ , z θ ): with u θ [t0,T ] defined as the convex combination of the inputs, the resulting state trajectory is the convex combination (x θ [t0,T ] , z θ [t0,T ] ). Consequently,
where the first inequality is the definition of J as an infimum, and the second follows from convexity of the cost function. The proof of (i) is completed on taking the infimum over u i [t0,T ] for each i = 0, 1. We next prove (ii). It is clear from the definitions that K (x σ , z σ , t 0 ) ≤ J (x, z, t 0 ); we establish next the reverse inequality, for each x, z, t 0 . For δ > 0 fixed, the following pair of bounds will be established:
Since δ > 0 is arbitrary, these bounds are sufficient to establish (ii). The first inequality follows because the cost function is non-negative, so only the second requires proof. Let x , z ∈ R M denote the optimizers in (12) , so that in particular x σ = x σ , z σ = z σ . Let u denote the input described in Lemma 7.1 with x + = x , z + = z . The resulting state trajectory satisfies the conclusions of Lemma 7.1, so that in particular x δ (t 0 + δ) = x + O(δ).
We thus obtain the desired bound:
The first inequality is due to Bellman's principle of optimality, while the second approximation is a consequence of the following: (i) the first cost term is bounded by O(δ) as a consequence of the cheap control input, (ii) J is Lipschitz with respect to the state variables (as it is convex), and (iii) the definition of K in (12) .
Co-state dynamics:
The dynamics of the dual variables appearing in Prop. 3.2 are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2: Let t 0 ∈ (0, T ). The optimal input-state (u , x , z ) and dual variables {λ , β } satisfy the following co-state equations:
Proof: The state (x (t), z (t)) is continuously differentiable and the control u (t) is continuous on [t 0 , T ] as a consequence of (A2). In addition, the dynamics, eqs. (7d) and (7e), are linear and hence continuously differentiable with respect to each of the variables. Further, (A1) implies that the cost function c in (9) is continuously differentiable with respect to all the variables. Consequently, the optimal input-state pair u , (x , z ) satisfies Pontryagin's minimum principle on the closed interval [t 0 , T ] [27, Section 4.2]. The rest of the proof follows from this result. In particular, the minimum principle implies Optimal input for the descriptor system:
The next result provides the optimal input u σ for the optimal descriptor system states (x σ , z σ ): Lemma 7.3: Let t 0 ∈ (0, T ). The optimal input on [t 0 , T ] is u σ (t) = d dt (t) −
Consequently, β (t) := β i (t), λ (t) := λ i (t) are independent of i. Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 7.2, the conclusion (30) is a consequence of Pontryagin's minimum principle, and the first-order condition for minimality: 0 = ∂ ∂u H x (t), z (t), u (t), λ (t), β (t), t) This establishes (30) , which then implies that β i (t) is independent of i for each t. The conclusion that λ i (t) is also independent of i follows from eq. (29b).
The lemma reinforces the co-state collapse identified in Prop. 3.2. The proof of the latter is provided next. Proof of Prop. 3.2: The left hand equalities in (19) are a familiar result: the optimal co-state trajectory is the gradient of the value function with respect to the state variable [29, Theorem 3.1]. The right-hand equalities are from the definition (13) .
Proof of Thm. 3.1:
Equations (15a) and (15b) are the state equations. Equations (15c) and (15d) and the final time boundary conditions on the co-state variables follow from Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3. The optimal feedback policy (15e) is obtained from Lemma 7.3. The initial state mapping x(0+), z(0+) is given by (16) . As a consequence of (A2) and the fact that the cost functional is strictly convex with respect to the control and that the dynamics are linear, the solution (x , z , λ , β , u ) satisfying Pontryagin's minimum principle is both necessary and sufficient for optimality [30, Chapter 7] . Proof of Prop. 3.3: As ∈ C 1 , it follows from assumption (A1) and (8) that L g , L i ∈ C 1 . Moreover, (g (t),ġ (t)) and (x i (t),ẋ i (t)) are continuous on the half-open interval (0, T ]. Consequently, the Euler-Lagrange equations form the necessary first-order conditions for weak extrema [27, Section 2.3.3] . The solution to the minimization problem in (21) and (22) at the stationary minimum are the following Euler-Lagrange equations, (24) and comparing with (15c) yields x i (t) = x i (t) for each i, which is the optimal solution to the primal problem (7a). This implies that there is no duality gap: −λ maximizes the dual functional φ . Proof of Prop. 4.1: The proof follows from integrating (24) and (23) over (0, T ] and dividing throughout by T . In particular, the error terms follow from the fundamental theorem of calculus.
